



# The Responsibilities of Rhetoric

*Michelle Smith Barbara Warnick*

For information about this book, contact:

Waveland Press, Inc.  
4180 IL Route 83, Suite 101  
Long Grove, IL 60047-9580  
(847) 634-0081  
info@waveland.com  
www.waveland.com

**On the cover:** This image of the London suffragettes depicts the enactment of responsibilities by rhetors who sought to rectify oppression and the denial of franchise in their society.

Copyright © 2010 by Waveland Press, Inc.

10-digit ISBN 1-57766-623-2

13-digit ISBN 978-1-57766-623-3

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher.*

Printed in the United States of America

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

# Public Deliberation and the Rhetorical “Real”

## Balancing Accomplishment and Complication in Republican-Democratic Structures

*Todd Kelshaw*

In idealizing and describing public deliberation, it is difficult for theorists and practitioners to ignore its inherent messiness. Deliberation is regularly depicted as juxtapositional, complementary, and even antidotal to less dialogic kinds of political talk such as public address, debate, and diatribe. Accordingly we have come to know deliberation as a means for accomplishing various integrative goals in civic discourse. These include the pluralistic inclusion of culturally and epistemologically diverse voices (Bohman 261; Kaveny 313–14), the development of sophisticated understandings about complex public problems (Gastil and Dillard 20–21), and the application of flexible problem solving processes that build cohesive communities (Doble Research Associates 52–53). As such, public deliberation is portrayed as the discursive embodiment of the town hall meeting; an enactment of what is most potentially populist, polyphonic, and equivocal about democracy. In a mass society in which lay citizens rarely participate directly in governance, deliberative public meetings are important opportunities—even if participants usually fulfill mere advisory roles, leaving the real policy decisions to professionals: elected and appointed government officials (Gastil 30–31). Deliberation’s inclusive pluralism, complication (rather than simplification) of public problems, potential open-endedness, and questionable efficacy may make it seem inefficient as a civic process. It is, however, clearly attractive to many. Those who are likely to value it above discourses that are comparatively decisive (e.g., debate) and resolute (e.g., majority-rule voting and executive decree) may be thinkers and practitioners who appreciate “muddleheaded anecdotalism” in legal contexts (Simons 22), the “messiness” and “unfinalizability” of relationships (Baxter and Montgomery 232–33), and the “spirit of playfulness” of some approaches to moral conflict (Pearce and Littlejohn 47).

But are deliberation's outcomes necessarily so incomplete, indirect in their policy consequences, and abstract? Notwithstanding the United States' alleged dearth of institutional mechanisms for conducting public deliberation and transcribing it into concrete policy (Mathews 14–15), the genre has a telic dimension that is often neglected or minimized in conceptual treatments. If deliberative democrats and other celebrants of public deliberation are to improve the potentials, processes, and outcomes of participatory public governance, it is crucial to forge conceptualizations and practices that appropriately balance decisiveness and materialism on one hand and openness and idealism on the other.

This essay describes public deliberation as a rhetorical modality with great potential for influencing not only individual and public understandings of shared problems but also concrete solutions. It does this by teasing out deliberation and dialogue—two speech genres that are frequently conflated by academics and practitioners (Gastil and Kelshaw 55)—and by stressing deliberation's telic ambition and potential. Specifically, this essay addresses the importance of discursive balance in a republican-democratic society; portrays some prominent forms of republican-democratic talk; and finally speaks to deliberation's rhetorical potential for bridging pluralistic abstraction and the actionable “real.” These objectives are motivated by a sense of public deliberation as a crucial civic speech genre that manifests fundamental republican-democratic tensions in a way that no other rhetorical mode does. Public deliberation, this essay asserts, tempers the contradictory needs for complication and accomplishment in public talk, enabling participants to collaboratively realize both unfinalizable abstractions and actionable policy decisions.

## REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS RHETORICAL TENSIONS

A large-scale organization that is conceived in ideals of popular self-governance features a broad range of communicative processes. These include information provision, community building, problem solving, and policy making. Since the social structure is too populous to permit full voice and efficacy for all individuals, it is necessary to employ both direct and representational mechanisms. These mechanisms are, respectively, democratic and republican. Simply put, democratic mechanisms enable participants to engage in direct (either face-to-face or mediated) action or interaction whereas republican mechanisms place executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities in the hands of elected and appointed officials. In the spirit of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle (68), by which understanding is accomplished through the back-and-forth weaving of macro- and micro-contexts (the “whole” and its “parts,” respectively), a republican democracy is maintained through the interaction of broad-based representative control and localized democratic engagement.

Communication is subject to various rhetorical tensions across this spectrum of republican-democratic processes. Informed by Bakhtin's dialectical approach, these tensions may be understood as tending, in degrees, centripe-




tally or centrifugally (272–73). Communication processes that tend centripetally are relatively decisive, authoritative, stabilizing, and preserving of traditions. They feature speech acts that do things such as convey information, issue directives, mete out punishments, enact policies, and manifest stratified institutional roles. Conversely, processes that tend centrifugally are relatively open-ended, insurgent, destabilizing, and change-minded. They feature speech acts that problematize information and ask probing questions, resist authority and traditional rules, and empower or give voice to institutionally subjugated and marginalized social members.

The array of speech acts and genres that make up any given social structure vary widely in their qualities. Considered in sum, they reveal the structure’s general condition. Republican-democratic structures, uniquely, may be recognized by their general temperance of centripetal and centrifugal forces, in which closed-ended (centripetal) and open-ended (centrifugal) rhetorical modes achieve quasi-counterbalance. This is a subtle negotiation in which public policies are both accomplished and complicated in more-or-less equal measure. The “more-or-less”-ness of this imperfect equilibrium reflects the notion that any given social structure is constantly remade in participants’ dynamic interaction (Giddens 17), so static balance is impossible.

This definition of republican democracy distinguishes it from other organizational forms. Social structures that experience a preponderance of explicit rules, regulatory controls like censorship and gate keeping, and other centripetally leaning discourses tend toward autocracy or authoritarianism. Their social orders are maintained in unilateral expressions of brute information and directives that enforce centralized control while stifling insurgence. Designated leadership, established roles, unquestioned traditions, and control mechanisms tend to be formally codified. At the other end of the organizational/rhetorical continuum—the centrifugal one—social structures with few explicit regulations and disciplinary procedures but plenty of equivocal voices lean toward anomie or anarchy. Discursive struggles occur through multilateral decentralization of authority and destabilization of public order. Leadership is emergent and fluid, and implicit social norms are negotiated (and disrupted) among participants rather than imposed from atop or outside. In contrast to these extremes, republican democracy, as philosophers like Dewey and Bernstein posit, is an ethically grounded ideal, an Aristotelian golden mean.

Just as some Bakhtin-inspired thinkers apply a dialectical approach to understanding interpersonal relationships (e.g., Baxter and Montgomery 4; Shotter 50), it is fruitful to think similarly about organizational structures. Identifying the *accomplishment/complication* dialectic is the fundamental step in understanding the tensions among a republican democracy’s rhetorical genres. Akin to what Kaner (6) describes as a dynamic between “convergent” and “divergent” kinds of thinking during group problem-solving discussion, the accomplishment/complication dialectic encompasses several related continua (see figure 1).



**Figure 1. The accomplishment/complication dialectic.**

The more-or-less balancing of these dialectics plays out (or, ideally, *should* play out) in a republican democracy through its enactment of diverse speech genres. Different speech genres such as dialogue, debate, deliberation, public address, and diatribe manifest particular rhetorical modes that fulfill important complementary functions. It is to these genres and their rhetorical functions that the essay now turns.

## RHETORICAL MODES OF REPUBLIC DEMOCRACY

The various genres of talk that maintain a republican-democratic body fulfill different rhetorical functions ranging from accomplishment to complication. Considering that a republican democracy strives to temper qualities of speech along this dialectic, it is helpful to briefly describe some prominent forms and the rhetorical functions that they serve.

Along the accomplishment/complication continuum, speech genres manifest different qualities (see figure 2).

Consistent with these qualities, there are particular functions that communication fulfills in a republican democracy. Policy making, law enforcement, budgeting, and information provision are some essential functions that may reflect *accomplishing* qualities. Functions that might reflect *complicating* qualities include civil disobedience, moral conflict enactment, public hearings, and community block parties. The difference between these two sets is, respectively, between resolving and prodding open substantive, procedural, and relational issues.

Among others in republican-democratic discourse, four speech genres are especially prominent: oratory/public address, debate, deliberation, and




Figure 2. Rhetorical qualities along the accomplishment/complication dialectic.

dialogue. These forms manifest different and, in ways, complementary tendencies along the accomplishing/complicating continuum (see figure 3).

Oratory has predominant centripetal features and thus tends toward the *accomplishing* end of the continuum. The tendency toward monologism that characterizes public address gives this genre what Baxter and Montgomery describe as a penchant to “treat communication as one-sided and unvoiced. . . . [T]he focus is on sameness . . . a focus that creates a fiction of consistency and completeness” (46). In oratory, speakers use “heresthetical” and “rhetorical” strategies to affect their audiences. Heresthetic is “the art of setting up situations—composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose” (Riker 9). It is the communicative process of putting an issue or set of issues on the table. Once the table is set, communicators use what Riker calls “rhetorical” strategies to frame those issues in particular ways. This happens through what Aristotle (37–39) describes as conscientious appeals to reason (*logos*), emotions (*pathos*), and the communicator’s perceived identity/credibility in relation to the




Figure 3. Four prominent republican-democratic speech genres.

topic and the audience (*ethos*). Whereas both heresthetical and rhetorical strategies may be applied in many different speech genres, in address—which is typically conceived and enacted in unilateral ways to do things like inform, persuade, and scold—they may be effective tools of discursive control. Even in the face of centrifugal speech acts such as heckling, public address preserves the primacy of the orator's voice as a controlling force.

Debate, too, leans toward the *accomplishing* end of the dialectic. But, unlike public address, there are two or more distinct voices with different (often mutually exclusive) and potentially equal perspectives. Debate is, in a sense, a confrontation of two or more oratorical addresses, or what might be thought of as “parallel monologues” (Baxter and Montgomery 46), that advance opposing attitudes. Debate can effectively address public problems, but, in cases of entrenched opposition, it can limit productive contact. When that happens, debaters speak as representatives of groups and usually direct their messages to distinct constituents or to an undecided middle. They tend to speak in ways that convey stubborn commitments to points of view (Chasin et al. 326).

On the opposite end of the *accomplishment/complication* dialectic, interactants may engage in dialogue. Dialogue marries the Greek words *dia* and *logos* to signify “meaning through”; that is, joint understandings that emerge through participants during engaged interaction (Bohm 6). Isaacs characterizes dialogue as “a conversation with a center, not sides” that provides a “way of taking the energy of our differences and channeling it toward something that has never been created before” (607). As Anderson, Cissna, and Arnett state, “Dialogue implies more than a simple back-and-forthness of messages in interaction; it points to a particular process and quality of communication in which the participants ‘meet,’ which allows for changing and being changed” (10). Dialogic communication is useful for building sophisticated understandings of complex cultural and community problems, and for bridging relational, cultural, and moral divides. Whereas these are accomplishments in a particular sense, they cannot be mistaken for firm resolutions of public problems or pronouncements of certainty.

Deliberation, it is important to note, inhabits the middle of the accomplishment/complication scale. This characterization of deliberation as a speech genre that experiences more-or-less balanced measures of centripetal and centrifugal rhetorical forces is this essay's centerpiece. Because public deliberation is typically cast as an antidote to elite control of republic-democratic processes and a means to empower people who have been shut out of politics (Mathews 2–3), it might be easy to think of it as purely dialogic. In fact, one study conducted during 2001 and 2002 found that a significant number of theorists and practitioners used “dialogue” and “deliberation” synonymously (Gastil and Kelshaw 55). But as it enables interactive participants “to weigh carefully both the consequences of various options for action and the views of others” in order to make good, joint decisions (Mathews 110), deliberation has an important goal orientation beyond its dialogic qual-

ities. It is this temperance that establishes public deliberation uniquely as the hallmark of republican-democratic social structures.

## PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND THE ENACTMENT OF RHETORICAL BALANCE

As a rhetorical microcosm of republican-democratic processes, public deliberation features both dialogic and monologic rhetorical qualities. Accordingly, it affords opportunities for members of a republican-democratic polity to speak and listen to other diverse voices, forge subtle understandings of complex public problems, and ultimately develop actionable solutions. Public deliberation provides a discursive bridge between abstract understandings of identities, relationships, and common issues on one hand and what may be called “the real” on the other. An appropriate way to explain this is to discuss both the dialogic qualities and the telic (goal-oriented) nature of deliberation.

### Dialogic Features of Public Deliberation

As described in detail elsewhere (Kelshaw 4–10), dialogue is defined by several key characteristics—intersubjectivity, openness, relinquishing of control, and destabilization—and participants’ attitudes—availability, flexibility, and commitment to the conversation. Dialogue, then, is highly centrifugal; its participants share joint control of potentially contested and unfinalizable meanings through communication behaviors that ensure mutual vulnerability.

Deliberation shares much with dialogue. Cohen (22–23) identifies four aspects of the “ideal deliberative procedure” in civic contexts that reflect dialogic features. The first of these is participants’ freedom from authoritative constraints. The emphasis here is on emergent norms and understandings, and on control that is shared among interactants rather than exogenously imposed. This does not mean that public deliberation occurs in a vacuum. Structures and rules (legal, ethical, procedural, etc.) must be in place in order for deliberation to occur at all. As well, deliberation requires *some* discursive rules and limits. In deliberation, though, participants jointly set the terms of their interaction. They collaboratively negotiate their conversation’s framework, jointly empowered by what is happening *within* their interaction.

Cohen’s second aspect is the provision of reasons to support proposals and criticisms. Whereas this emphasis on rationality does, in a sense, depart from dialogue (which enjoys freedom from exogenous constraints such as formal rules of argument), it is important to observe that “reason” is broader than an authoritative quasi-logical form. Practical reasoning is relationally, culturally, and situationally contingent; the more pluralistic the deliberating group, the more likely that diverse forms of practical reason may affect participants’ willingness and abilities to think and talk together flexibly and equally. In forging “ethical collectivism,” participants aspire to a “constructed consensus” that is “based upon the collective consideration of the

moral opinions of participants in discourse,” and that is acceptable if they mutually agree that the discursive process is justified, that all cogent views have been considered, and that “the conclusion agreed upon, judged in the light of the standards of the procedure, is better than any other proposal that has been considered” (Thompson 2).

Cohen’s third feature of public deliberation is equality. Equality means that the rules of the deliberative procedure should neither advantage nor disadvantage any individual. Participants should have equal and adequate opportunities to speak and should maintain an egalitarian collective without formal stratification. (Rotating chairship is one good strategy.) Inclusion is part and parcel of equality, as it raises and legitimates diverse perspectives. Diversity aids the challenging of prevailing rules and norms and permits new ways of speaking and thinking about issues.

The fourth aspect in Cohen’s list is group effort toward consensus. This is an attitude that precedes any concrete outcomes (to be discussed further along). It privileges not the kinds of tidily resolved decisions of majority-rule voting but rather something much more relationally and substantively complicating. Consensus is not always achievable, but Cohen emphasizes a *spirit* of consensus as a feature of ideal deliberation because it reminds group members that they are bound by common goals.

## Telic Features of Public Deliberation

The dialogic features of public deliberation prod things open with regard to inclusively pluralistic participation, relationship building (interpersonally, interculturally, and community-based), and sophisticated understandings of complex problems. These are some of the qualities that are most regularly cited in pro-deliberation literature (e.g., Mathews and McAfee 8–9). Public deliberation potentially does well to complicate the public sphere by bringing diverse people into the civic process and heightening their sophisticated understandings. Of course, these are valuable outcomes of deliberation, but they are *precursors* to the creation and implementation of concrete public policy, and they are prone to inconsequentiality. To conflate dialogue and deliberation is to emphasize these unfinalizable outcomes (which are really ongoing processes) while de-emphasizing deliberation’s more actionable products. Doing so would be to paint only half of the picture, so to speak. What must also be addressed is public deliberation’s rhetorical penchant for accomplishment.

As described more elaborately elsewhere (Kelshaw 14–16), public deliberation has three characteristics that distinguish it from dialogue and complement its centrifugal features: its concern for task closure, its focus on future courses of action, and its rational weighing of evidence. Simply put, deliberation is “a small-group, discussion-based approach to deciding future courses of action based on careful weighing of evidence” (14). This definition distinguishes deliberation from dialogue, which does not necessarily concern closed-ended decision making, the future tense, and quasi-logical reasoning based in factual evidence.

The first telic-minded characteristic of public deliberation is its concern for task closure. Dialogue cares mostly about the transformation of ideology and relationships through transcendent ways of speaking. Such changes occur through an “ongoing interplay between oppositional features” (Baxter and Montgomery 6) that takes the form of “ongoing messiness” (3). Dialogue’s chief product, then, is the process itself: “an open exploration rather than decision making” (Gastil and Kelshaw 55). Public deliberation, further, strives for goals that are concrete, such as policy decisions or, more indirect but still fairly consequential, formal recommendations to institutional officials.

The second important telic aspect of deliberation is its concern for the future tense. In juridical contexts like criminal court cases, for example, deliberation is group decision making that considers facts in the past (guilt or innocence) as well as courses of future action (sentencing). But the language of republican-democratic civic participation focuses on the latter (relying, of course, on participants’ understandings of past and enduring facts). This emphasis reflects an understanding of deliberation that dates to ancient Greek democracy. Aristotle (47–78) distinguishes between forensic (*dikanikon*), occasional (*epideiktikon*), and deliberative (*symboleutikon*) modes of rhetoric. These three types pertain to, respectively, past, present, and future tenses. The rhetorical interactivities of participants in public deliberation deal ultimately with the derivation of policies: future courses of action. However much public deliberation initially builds upon knowledge of past facts and present conditions and, secondly, participants’ attitudes and values, it is ultimately an activity of the future tense. This characteristic distinguishes deliberation from dialogue, which focuses largely on the development of participants’ beliefs, attitudes, and values—all of which inhabit the present tense.

Public deliberation’s third key feature is its concern for analytic consideration of sound evidence. This is a concern that is not prominent in dialogue, a genre that is more permissibly emotional in its preference for empathic over rational communication. Deliberation’s requirement of sound argumentation is central as, for example, Habermas’ notion of ideal speech (embodied in deliberation) avows. Regardless of the different cultural approaches that diverse participants may bring to the deliberative process, all must be able to articulate individual interests and policy preferences in ways that are understandable and valid (if not agreeable) to others. Participants’ reflective and explicit clarifications of their potentially differing standards of reasoning and evidence are crucial to deliberation. Otherwise their communication may fail, creating power imbalances that violate deliberation’s dialogic requirements and prohibiting effective decision outcomes.

## CONCLUSION: BRIDGING THE ABSTRACT AND THE “REAL”

This essay’s purpose is to conceptually tease out public deliberation and dialogue, which are two terms and practices that are at great risk of conflation. The first reason for doing so is that I wish to portray public deliberation

as a crucial speech genre of republican democracy—one that actually manifests republican democracy through its tempering application of rhetorical qualities that both accomplish and complicate. Another reason for distinguishing deliberation is that doing so with an emphasis on the genre’s oft-neglected telic nature may suggest its capacity for bridging unfinalizable abstractions (such as relationships and ideologies) with “the real.”

Communication theorists and practitioners have tremendous responsibility to *do*. This is especially true in the context of republican democracy, in which *doing* (as opposed to having things *done to one*, or simply being *done in* by others) is the basis of social organization. Rhetoric—its study and application—has only minimal consequence if its ideas are not actionable. Along this line, public deliberation, which continues to garner increased attention in academic fields like communication, public administration, political science, and law, must be moved from a philosophical ideal to a relationship and community builder to, ultimately, an institutional force for popular empowerment and ethical policy making.

Today, there are numerous public deliberation projects and programs worldwide, such as the Kettering Foundation’s affiliate Study Circles, Citizen Juries, and National Issues Forums. These are laudable efforts that are supported by theoretical and empirical scholarship as well as guidebooks and other resources to be used by facilitators and participants. They help to make public deliberation practicable and practical. But what is largely missing in republican-democratic societies like the United States is an *institutional* component that can function *within* the structure of formal governance to infuse deliberative products into public policy, and not merely policy recommendations or voting behaviors, both of which minimize the democratic dimension of republican democracy.<sup>1</sup>

The definition of republican democracy that was posed early in this essay—a social organizational form in which closed-ended (centripetal) and open-ended (centrifugal) rhetorical modes achieve quasi-counterbalance—is intended to honor the important functions of discourses that both accomplish and complicate. It is a bit too easy sometimes to celebrate dialogue and to demean debate. Both fulfill important functions. The beauty and value of public deliberation is that it is really a *meta*-genre of speech, enabling an array of rhetorical qualities spanning centripetal closure and centrifugal openness. In this sense, it provides a bridge between abstract things like sophisticated understandings of public problems and the messiness of interpersonal, cultural, and community relationships on one hand and, on the other, concrete things like legislation and municipal budgets. This bridge may be thought of, and acted on, as the rhetorical “real.”

## Note

<sup>1</sup> One example of a potentially deliberative structure that is institutionalized is the Spokane (WA) Community Assembly, which brings representatives of officially recognized Neighborhood Councils together to address public issues. This body, which advises the City Council, is



an actual component of government, as determined by public referendum in 1999. See <http://www.spokaneneighborhoods.org/> and <http://communityassembly.spokaneneighborhoods.org/> for information.

## Works Cited

- Anderson, Rob, Kenneth N. Cissna, and Ronald C. Arnett, eds. *The Reach of Dialogue: Confirmation, Voice and Community*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton P, 1994.
- Aristotle. *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford UP, 1991.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail M. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist. Ed. M. Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.
- Baxter, Leslie A., and Barbara M. Montgomery. *Relating: Dialogues and Dialectics*. New York: Guilford P, 1996.
- Bernstein, Richard J. “The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos.” *Cardozo Law Review* 17 (1996): 1127–46.
- Bohm, David. *On Dialogue*. Ed. L. Nichol. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Bohman, James. “Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral Conflict.” *Political Theory* 23: 253–79.
- Chasin, Richard et al. “From Diatribe to Dialogue on Divisive Public Issues: Approaches Drawn from Family Therapy.” *Mediation Quarterly* 13 (1996): 323–44.
- Cohen, Joshua. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*. Ed. James Bohman and William Rehg. Cambridge: MIT P, 1997. 17–34.
- Dewey, John. “The Ethics of Democracy.” *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*. 2nd series. Ann Arbor, MI: Andrews, 1888.
- Doble Research Associates. “Responding to the Critics of Deliberation.” Report prepared for the Kettering Foundation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Author, 1996.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “On the Circle of Understanding.” *Hermeneutics Versus Science?* Trans. and Ed. John M. Connolly and Thomas Keutner. Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 1988.
- Gastil, John. *By Popular Demand*. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000.
- Gastil, John, and James P. Dillard. “Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public Deliberation.” *Political Communication* 16 (1999): 3–23.
- Gastil, John, and Todd Kelshaw. “What Does it Mean to Deliberate?: A Study of the Meaning of Deliberation in Academic Journals and the On-Line Publications of Membership Associations.” Kettering Foundation, Dayton, OH, March 2002.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1984.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Theory of Communicative Action*. Trans. T. A. McCarthy. Vol. 1. Boston: Beacon P, 1984.
- Isaacs, William. “A Conversation with a Center, Not Sides.” *Bridges Not Walls*. 9th ed. Ed. John Stewart. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002. 606–11
- Kaner, Sam. *Facilitator’s Guide to Participatory Decision-making*. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society, 1996.
- Kaveny, M. Cathleen. “Diversity and Deliberation: Bioethics Commissions and Moral Reasoning.” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 34 (2006): 311–37.
- Kelshaw, Todd. “Understanding Abnormal Public Discourses: Dialogue and Deliberation Defined.” *International Journal of Public Participation* 1 (2007).
- Mathews, David. *Politics for People: Finding a Responsible Public Voice*. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1994.

- Mathews, David, and Noëlle McAfee. *Making Choices Together: The Power of Public Deliberation*. Dayton, OH: Kettering Foundation, 2001.
- Pearce, W. Barnett, and Stephen W. Littlejohn. *Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1977.
- Riker, William H. *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1996.
- Shotter, John. *Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language*. London: Sage, 1993.
- Simons, Herbert W. "In Praise of Muddleheaded Anecdotalism." *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 42 (1978): 21–28.
- Thompson, Janna. *Discourse and Knowledge: Defence of a Collectivist Ethics*. London: Routledge, 2002.