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Remembering “Memory”: The Emergence and Performance of an Institutional Keyword in Communication Studies
Todd Kelshaw & Jeffrey St. John

“Memory” is an increasingly invoked yet disparately conceived keyword in communication scholarship. With different significances that are endemic to distinct disciplinary enclaves, scholars who read and apply the word risk mistreating it as a primitive term that is devoid of contestation. In order better to understand the term’s historical emergence and various (and sometimes incommensurate) conceptualizations, this study tracks “memory” through the past 55 years of communication scholarship. In tracing its emergence and applications across cognitive, relational (group), and public/cultural conceptions, the term may be recognized as an important marker and purveyor of the communication discipline’s ideological divisions and theoretical multiplicities.

What is the significance—and practical consequence—when a contemporary communication scholar uses the term “memory”? The word’s use is rooted in psychological realms of communication inquiry but has been appropriated in recent decades by scholars of cultural studies and rhetoric. Today, the term is employed variously across epistemological niches of the communication discipline, increasingly among rhetoricians. Contestation along epistemological/ideological faults, though, is sometimes obscured by the term’s casual use, which results in a mistaken sense that “memory” is a primitive term that is devoid of controversy. This obfuscation of disciplinary fault lines advances an illusory confidence in the solidity of communication studies’—and, more specifically, rhetorical studies’—organizational identity and norms.

Todd Kelshaw is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Montclair State University. Jeffrey St. John is Faculty Fellow in the Honors Tutorial College at Ohio University. Correspondence to: Todd Kelshaw, Department of Communication Studies, Life Hall 050, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA. Email: kelshawt@mail.montclair.edu

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This essay is the first in a two-part series in which we trace the emergence of “memory” from its earlier uses in the broader American communication discipline to its current residency in the more specific, although quite pluralistic, realm of rhetorical inquiry. In so doing, we conduct both a literature review and a reflective assessment of the contemporary communication discipline’s complicated cultural/organizational condition. This method of literature review—the tracking of a specific keyword through time and sub-disciplinary enclaves—permits insight into the various writings’ ideological motivations and cultural/organizational consequences.

In this essay, we take three steps. The first lays some expository groundwork concerning the emergent and contemporary American communication discipline as an organization, with complex systemic and cultural features that are both reflected and made (at least in part) by its vocabulary. We then look to “memory” as a particular institutional keyword that has taken different forms over time and across purposes. As the large body of scholarly writing about “memory” illustrates, the term is applied in ways that illuminate and maintain significant epistemological and ideological distinctions, with real consequences not only for the term’s conceptual significance but also for communication scholars’ evolving identities. This recognition is the basis of the essay’s subsequent discussion, which considers how the emergence and epistemological performance of “memory” across the discipline not only illuminates important fault lines but also reveals fertile sites of multiplicity.

Organizational Cultures and Institutional Keywords

However sprawling, pluralistic, porous, and evolving it may be, the communication discipline is an organization of sorts. As scholars such as Bennis (1969), Cheney (1999), Schein (1992), Schneider (1990), Shockley-Zalabak and Morley (1994), and Weick (1979)—to name only a few—point out, organizations have systemic and cultural dimensions that are potentially quite complicated, and which are both shaped and characterized by shared ways of speaking (Hymes, 1972; Philipsen, 1992) with particular vocabularies.

In considering the communication discipline organizationally, an initial observation is that it cannot be thought of in a unitary manner that coheres with the classical theories of organizational thinkers like Weber (1947), Taylor (1911), and Fayol (1949). Such theorists, who prescribe structures and methods for running organizations like well-oiled machines, idealize organizations as closed and unchanging entities with clearly identified and delineated parts (Morgan, 1986). Certainly, the American communication discipline of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries was and is not like that. It overlaps with other disciplines, has internal diversity, and changes constantly. It is helpful, then, to think of the communication discipline’s organizational condition in the pluralistic terms of systems (e.g., Farace, Monge, & Russell, 1977; Katz & Kahn, 1978) and cultures (e.g., Cheney, 1999; Schein, 1992). A systemic perspective provides a view of the complicated dynamics among and between internal sub-parts and external environments; a cultural perspective enables
understanding of how organizational premises are communicatively made and manifested.

Systemic and Cultural Complexity of the Communication Discipline

Systemically and culturally, the communication discipline is complicated on internal and external levels. Internally, it is characterized by a multitude of theoretical traditions and concrete institutional embodiments (e.g., membership associations). Externally, the discipline’s influences, extensions, and identity (or identities) pertain to many other definable academic and professional realms, all with their own organizational situations and cross-disciplinary relationships.

Internal complexity

The discipline’s internal functioning occurs through a complicated system of sub-disciplinal areas of study. These overlapping but definable enclaves have their own identities, senses of historical emergence, traditions of theory and research, literary reference-points, nomenclatures, writing styles, etc. They are manifested concretely as discrete professional associations (e.g., the Rhetoric Society of America) but more often as units housed by broader, geographically situated (and hierarchically ordered) bodies such as the International Communication Association, the National Communication Association, the Eastern Communication Association, and so on. The National Communication Association (n.d.), for instance, maintains the following 40 divisions, each with its own governance mechanism: American studies, applied communication, argumentation and forensics, Asian/Pacific American communication studies, basic course division, communication and aging, communication and the future, communication and law, communication apprehension and avoidance, communication assessment, communication ethics, communication and social cognition, critical and cultural studies, environmental communication, ethnography, experiential learning in communication, family communication, feminist and women studies, freedom of expression, gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender communication studies, group communication, human communication and technology, instructional development, international and intercultural communication, interpersonal communication, language and social interaction, Latino/Latina communication studies, mass communication, nonverbal, organizational communication, peace and conflict communication, performance studies, political communication, public address, rhetorical and communication theory, semiotics and communication, spiritual communication, theatre, training and development, and visual communication.

It is clear from this list that many topic areas overlap (e.g., interpersonal communication and language and social interaction, organizational communication and group communication, performance studies and theatre, etc.), and many others directly inform one another (e.g., political communication and environmental communication, family communication and interpersonal communication, critical and cultural studies and gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender communication studies, etc.). The fact that these divisions are structurally distinguished, though, both reflects
and solidifies their organizational identities’ distinctiveness. Surely, scholars of any
given special topic share something with every other communication scholar and
practitioner: a sense that human communication phenomena are important.
But their assumptions about what communication is, how it functions, and what
its ethical ramifications are may be quite different.
The implications of these differences for the communication discipline’s cultural
life are enormous. In many cases, sub-disciplinary premises and traditions are
divergent. “We appear to be operating primarily in separate domains,” claims Craig
(1999, p. 119). He continues:

Communication theorists apparently neither agree nor disagree about much of
anything. There is no canon of general theory to which they all refer. There are no
common goals that unite them, no contentious issues that divide them. For the
most part, they simply ignore each other. (pp. 119–120)

This cross-disciplinary ignorance manifests the problem that premises and traditions
are not only divergent, but, in some cases, wholly antithetical. If diverse commu-
nication scholars are, in Gudykunst’s (1988) inter-cultural terminology, “strangers”
when they do meet across sub-disciplinary lines—as in the International Commu-
nication Association’s “paradigm dialogues” project (Penman, 1992)—they must
face anxiety, uncertainty, and challenge to their respective world-views. During these
encounters they must decide whether to reject, respect, cooperate, or merge with the
other’s epistemological approach and ideological framework (Griffin, 2006, pp. 520–
524). As Bostrom and Donohew (1992) attest, it may be utterly inappropriate to
accept or respect scholarship that is, by one’s own criteria, not rigorous. So, the
discipline’s only galvanizing norm may be a propensity for rejection, contestation,
myopia, and, ultimately, a scholarly identity that is forged in anathema and defined
by undefinability. As Bohm (1996) puts it, “[I]f one observes efforts to solve [‘the
problem of communication’], he (or she) will notice that different groups who are
trying to do this are not actually able to listen to each other” (p. 1).

External complexity
Not only is the communication discipline internally complex and rife with
epistemological and ideological contestation, it also maintains a complicated external
situation. In organizational terms, the discipline is porous; it bleeds into and out of
many other defined fields (such as anthropology, education, English, journalism,
political science, psychology, public administration, sociology, etc.). Historically and
cartographically, defining the discipline in any clear way is very difficult, as the recent
years’ frantically paced renaming and restructuring of academic departments
demonstrates. If communication issues are central to all fields—indeed, to humanity
as a whole—as many maintain (e.g., Pierce, 1972), then some may suggest that it
makes more sense to infuse communication studies into other disciplines than to
distinguish them. But, then again, aren’t such issues important enough to demand
focused inquiry? Well, if so, the reasoning continues, is there such a thing as a
“communication specialist” since the topics of inquiry are so sprawling? These are
problems that affect communication scholars’ and practitioners’ identities, organizational placement, access to resources, and, ultimately, professional relevance.

Of course, this macro-systemic complexity permits important cross-pollination. The contemporary communication discipline is highly synthetic, with great potential for inter-disciplinary symbiosis. On the other hand, though, the overlap with other academic fields can aggravate communication scholars’ identity problems and even elicit demeaning ridicule—as when the physicist Alan D. Sokal mocked post-modern communication scholars with his tongue-in-cheek paper, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” (1996). Communication is at risk of being perceived as a “soft science” that natural scientists and even psychologists tend to view as inferior (Machlup, 1994; Scriven, 1994). All of this is to say that the contemporary discipline is embedded in a complicated network of external relationships, and it is certainly subject to this web’s inherent power dynamics.

Tracing Institutional Keywords: A Method for Understanding Organizations

Given the potentials for constructive cross-pollination and destructive antagonism, the complicated internal and external situations of today’s communication discipline deserve attention. A given organization’s complex life may be described and assessed through various empirical and reflective techniques. One method is the identification and tracing of institutional keywords—particularly those that enjoy common usage but multifarious meanings. Shared keywords are important and consequential markers of affiliation and division within organizational contexts. When a particular keyword is used frequently among organizational members but with notably different meanings, a tracing of that term offers much to an understanding of the organization’s structural/discursive complexity. This applied approach is informed by aspects of Hymes’ (1972) “ethnography of speaking” conception, especially the assumption—drawn from Ferguson and Gumperz (1960)—that it is “superficial, indeed misleading, to speak of the language of a community” in any kind of singular sense (Hymes, 1972, p. 63). Even when a vocabulary, as one particular dimension of language, is shared among people, there may be different “norms of interpretation” across contexts and sub-communities (Hymes, 1972, p. 64). Meaning, to put it another way, may be understood as residing not in concrete words but in interlocutors’ joint applications of them (Roberts & Bavelis, 1996).

By tracing the diverse usages of a specific term across the literatures of communication studies (an internally and externally complex organization), the different norms of interpretation may become apparent and, with them, the discipline’s epistemological and ideological fault lines. Examining communication studies in this manner also provides an informative chronicle, in which the historical rise and ebb of assumptive leanings and dominant conceptual preferences may be recognized and understood in the larger contexts of sociology, politics, technology, and so on.
"Memory" in Communication Studies: The Emergence of a Contested Institutional Keyword

Considering that institutional keywords are loci of both organizational coherence and fragmentation, it is useful to explore the communication discipline's invocations of "memory" through time and scholarship. This is a word that has recurred increasingly during the past half-century, having become recognizable and wide-ranging in its applications. One useful method for garnering a representative sample of the term's usage is to conduct a title-keyword search of the Communication Institute for Online Scholarship (CIOS) database, which houses tables of contents of 58 institutionally prominent communication-related journals from 1915 to the present. A May 2006 search yielded 91 articles with "memory" in their titles, from 1951 (Donald E. Hargis' "Memory in Rhetoric") to 2004 (Elisia L. Cohen and Cynthia Willis' "One Nation under Radio: Digital and Public Memory after September 11")—a broad range both historically and topically.

Across this temporal and topical span, writings fall into three conceptual categories that reflect distinct epistemological/ideological enclaves. Accordingly, "memory" is portrayed as (1) a cognitive/psychological process or effect; (2) a process and product of interaction in group contexts; and (3) a process and product of public or cultural discourse. Figure 1 illustrates the development of scholarship in these three areas during the 55-year period.

Two things are immediately apparent in this graph. First, "memory" exploded into the communication discipline's nomenclature in the 1980s with 17 instances of CIOS-listed, "memory"-titled articles; it was invoked increasingly in the 1990s (38 instances); and it is currently enjoying a continuation of popularity growth (33 instances during just the first half-decade of the 2000s). The graph's second readily observable matter is a contestation between epistemological camps over terminological ownership. Whereas scholars with a psychological orientation initially established and advanced "memory" as a communication term, sociologically-minded scholars (of group interaction in one group and of rhetorical and critical cultural studies areas in another) have since embraced it, redefined it, and run with it. As of the mid-2000s, the public/cultural-oriented usage is prominent (with 19 occurrences as a CIOS-listed title keyword during the half-decade period) while the cognitive conception remains healthy (with 10 instances).

To understand better this terminological contestation's consequence for the broader communication studies discipline, it is necessary to explicate and explore

![Figure 1. CIOS's “memory”-titled articles, by decade and general approach](image-url)
the various usages. If communication scholars are employing “memory” in disparate ways but within different disciplinary enclaves, they run the risk of myopically and casually treating their conceptions as commonly understood—that is, as a universally significant “primitive” term (Chaffee, 1991; Hempel, 1952). Tracing the communication discipline’s various conceptions of “memory,” then, may minimize inadvertent conflation and illuminate the lines between distinct and, in some cases, incommensurate traditions and applications of communication scholarship. For this reason, it is helpful to address the three general orientations (psychological/cognitive, interactive, and public/cultural) and their respective special topic areas.

“Memory” as a Psychological/Cognitive Process

Of CIOS’s 91 journal articles with “memory” in the title, the majority (53) treat the term as a mental, individualized process or effect. These treatments represent the general branch of communication studies that is psychologically oriented. This approach’s essential assumption is that communication is a causal-linear process enacted between individualized agents. Across the 53 articles’ treatments, though, topical concerns vary. It is noteworthy that the term’s cognitive-oriented use’s heyday began in the 1980s (16 instances), intensified in the 1990s (25 instances), and endures in the 2000s, albeit with slight lessening (10 instances through the first half-decade). The conceptions of “memory” within the cognitive/psychological category share some basic and consequential assumptions about communication, which galvanize them within a general disciplinary and cultural realm. This approach maintains that communication is an epistemological tool that is used to represent/express objective reality in symbolic terms. As a tool, communication advances “the Enlightenment proclivity for analyses that begin with the Cartesian cogito and the irreducible distinction between the subject and the objects that subjects allegedly encounter, construct, and manipulate” (Stewart, 1996, p. 20). In this sense, people presumably use communication as a system of symbols to represent mental ideas—which themselves are representations of an a priori objective reality (Aristotle, 1963)—and, ultimately, to do things, like gain knowledge, persuade, etc. Communication is understood as a causal-linear process by which intentional actors influence one another and get things. The contents of their transmissions are treated as brute data, and measured primarily in quantities (Taylor, 1994) and in terms of the message-sender’s intention (Fiske, 1990). “Memory,” then, as a facet or product of communication, is understood essentially as a process and site of repository.

Cognitively oriented “memory” scholars may be recognized as inheritors of and contributors to what Craig (1999) calls the “socio-psychological” and “cybernetic” traditions of communication theory and inquiry. Socio-psychologically-minded scholars strive to analyze objectively communication processes in terms of their mental intentions, articulations, paths of transmission, and reception. Their interest is devoted to understanding communication as a process of interpersonal influence (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Adherents of cybernetic approaches conceive communication as a process of managing (sending, receiving, and housing)
information (e.g., Wiener, 1954). Like socio-psychologists, cyberneticists think in causal-linear terms and treat the content of communication in brute, objective ways. “Memory” in both traditions is basically conceived as an individual mental process—such as a skill—and as a personal container of information.

The articles that treat “memory” as a cognitive process address four topic areas (in order of historical emergence): rhetorical memoria, “conversational” and “episodic” memory (including concern for interpersonal influence), cognitive media effects (e.g., broadcast news recall and advertising strategies), and psycho-linguistics. Figure 2 illustrates the development of these conceptions.

Cognitive topic 1: Memoria
With Donald E. Hargis’s “Memory in Rhetoric” (1951), memoria is the first conception of “memory” (of any and all categories) that appears as a title-word in CIOS-listed articles. Whereas this Aristotelian (1991) sense of the term endures in public speaking textbooks, it has not appeared as a title-word in CIOS-listed articles since Wayne E. Hoogestrat (1960) posed this:

The term memory continues to appear in rhetoric and public speaking texts. Our query then is, how are these writers treating memory? Have we defined the ancient canon too narrowly, in that it might include more than the “training of [a public speaker’s] memory? (p. 141)

The broadening of “memory” that Hoogestrat proposes (as a resuscitation of the classical sense) does extend the term beyond rote memorizing skills, but keeps it within the realm of cognitive functioning:

To the ancients [memory] was a storehouse of knowledge, the repository of the idea, the arrangement, and frequently the word for word mental recollection of the written oration. It was always accompanied by a method or scheme for facilitating or even strengthening the memory . . . . To the moderns memory is intrinsic in the learning process . . . . [I]t includes the mental grasp of subject matter, a mental impression of the arrangement, and to some extent even a mental schedule of the delivery. (p. 147)

This treatment’s focus is upon what happens within an individual’s mind as opposed to, say, what happens relationally between a speaker and an audience. Considering Hoogestrat’s article as a representative example of memoria-related scholarship, it is clear that the topic area treats “memory” strictly as a cognitive

Figure 2. CIOS-listed articles that treat “memory” as a cognitive process or effect
process—a practical skill at least and, potentially, a holistic and necessary mental condition for communication effectiveness.

Cognitive topic #2: “Conversational” and “episodic” memory
The second conception of “memory” concerns individual interactants’ abilities to recall conversational information, with consequences for the qualities of their relationship development, persuasiveness, and other aspects of interpersonal influence. Within this topic area, the most specific terminological adaptations are the six-time-occurring “conversational memory,” which emerged as a title-phrase in Laura Stafford and John A. Daly’s “Conversational Memory: The Effects of Recall Mode and Memory Expectancies on Remembrances of Natural Conversations” (1984), and the twice-occurring “episodic memory,” which first appeared as a title-phrase in Woodall and Folger’s “Encoding Specificity and Nonverbal Cue Context: An Expansion of Episodic Memory Research” (1981).

Across this category’s literature, there is consistent treatment of “memory” as a process by which—as Pamela J. Benoit and William L. Benoit (1994), for example, state—“interactants store and access relevant information from prior conversations” (p. 274). Memory is understood as a mental processor of informational data, and is thus described and assessed in strictly cognitive terms:

Relationships develop across interactions and this research confirms that [conversational] participants remember more information from prior conversations than observers . . . . [C]onversational information remembered from prior interactions is available to play an important role in relationships developed over the course of several interactions. (p. 284)

This approach to “memory” treats it as an information-processing mechanism. Whereas this conception, which is generally characteristic of treatments across this topic area, does consider events of interaction, the level of analysis is the individual as a distinct, thinking agent. In this manner, the topic area falls squarely within the category of cognitive “memory” conceptions.

Cognitive topic #3: Cognitive media effects
The third application of “memory” to arise in the cognitive/psychological category has become the most prominent: cognitive media effects, with emphases on broadcast news recall and advertising effectiveness. This topic area arose in the 1980s, with four CIOS-listed articles during that decade. In the 1990s the topic area surged, becoming the most visible niche of the cognitive/psychological category with 15 memory-titled articles (nearly doubling the formerly dominant “conversational”/“episodic” memory category). In the first half of the 2000s, 10 CIOS-listed articles address individuals’ mental processing of mass-media content. These account for all cognitive/psychological treatments of “memory” during this period.

A representative article from this topic area is Jeffrey A. Gibbons, Rodney J. Vogl, and Tom Grimes’s “Memory Misattributions for Characters in a Television News Story” (2003). The conception of “memory” employed here is solidly cognitive:
Commercial television news stories often employ complex story lines involving complicated relationships among characters. The confusion is often so great that people who appear in these news stories are unintentionally defamed because some viewers come away having misattributed illegal actions to the wrong person. Human information processes might be motivating these misattributions. (p. 99)

The authors stress that whereas mass media-related issues may appear to require scholarly treatment primarily from public-discursive angles, a cognitive approach may also be valuable:

[T]heoretical research in social psychology and human information processing are two areas of human inquiry that would seem antithetical to the hurry-up profession of commercial television news. However, research in these areas might provide solid answers to persistent problems in television news productions. (p. 111)

In this case, a psychological approach is applied to identify and propose remedies for a specific problem (news viewers’ inability to recall accurately and distinguish perpetrators from victims). Across this topic area, a psychological approach is used to address a variety of distinct but related problems, including television news retention (e.g., Findahl & Hoijer, 1985), print advertising effectiveness (e.g., Cordell & Zinkhan, 1989), and Internet advertising effectiveness (e.g., Diao & Sundar, 2004).

Cognitive topic #4: Psycho-linguistics
Of the CIOS-listed “memory”-titled articles that fall into the cognitive/psychological category, only two do not fit tidily into the memoria, “conversational”/“episodic” memory, and media effects categories: Tony M. Lentz’s “From Recitation to Reading: Memory, Writing, and Composition in Greek Philosophical Prose” (1985) and Julie Foertsch’s “Where Cognitive Psychology Applies: How Theories about Written Memory and Transfer can Influence Composition Pedagogy” (1995). Both pieces address psycho-linguistic dimensions of memory and their effects on written communication.

In Lentz’s (1985) case, the treatment of “memory” overlaps significantly with that in the memoria topic area, insofar as the concept’s treatment has direct ties to classical rhetoricians’ applications. “One might logically have expected the genre of philosophical discourse in ancient Greece to provide a clear exception to the reliance on the oral tradition of memory that the Greeks closely associated with poetry and drama,” Lentz writes (p. 49). But this usage of “memory” differs from the rhetorical canon of memoria since Lentz is not only interested in how ancient Greek philosophers considered “memory,” but in how the concept plays out practically for them during their modal shift from spoken to written presentation. “Written signs made abstract philosophical thought possible, despite the concrete, emotional power of the oral tradition,” he notes (p. 49). The role of, and effects upon, cognitive memory with regard to literacy is this topic area’s chief concern. Similarly, Foertsch (1995) is concerned with the role of “memory” in the process of written composition, as she strives “to bridge the misleading dichotomy between local knowledge and general knowledge by applying what cognitive psychologists have discovered about
memory, expertise, and the transfer-of-learning to the question of appropriate composition pedagogy” (p. 360).

These psycho-linguistic applications of “memory” are distinct from the topic areas of memoria, “conversational memory,” and cognitive media effects. Their concern for the differences between oral and literate “wirings” of the mind, though—and how these wirings affect communication practices—locates the treatments solidly within the cognitive/psychological category of “memory” scholarship.

“Memory” as a Process and Product of Interpersonal (Group) Interaction

Of CIOS’s 91 “memory”-titled journal articles, six treat the term as a process and product of interpersonal/intragroup interaction. These were first represented in 1990, with Karin Aronsson and Claes Nilholm’s “On Memory and the Collaborative Construction and Deconstruction of Custody Case Arguments.” In 2003, four articles were published on the topic of “group memory,” which appeared in a special issue of the journal Human Communication Research.

The six articles in this category share some basic assumptions about communication. These assumptions mark a large and philosophically important leap away from those of the cognitive/psychological orientation. Whereas the cognitive/psychological “memory” scholars base their conceptions in a sense of communication as a causal-linear and expressive/representational process, the interaction-minded scholars view it in creative terms. The distinction is what has been described by Deetz (1994), for one, as between “expression processes” and “constitutive processes” that are extensions, respectively, of an instrumental “informational” approach and a “communicational” approach (pp. 574–579). The latter perspective, which is adopted by interaction-minded “memory” scholars, questions “the autonomous subject and the representational view of language” by uniting formerly conceived distinct elements—“inner world, outer world, social relations, means of expression”—and looking “at the social production of meaning between individuals” (Deetz, pp. 576–577). This emphasis on what happens between individuals (in a complicated rather than linear-causal way) as opposed to within their individual minds is the approach’s foundation, and what essentially separates it from the cognitive/psychological orientation (Roberts & Bavelis, 1996; Shotter, 1993; Stewart, 1995). “Memory” is thus conceived as a shared product of interaction instead of a privately held thing or skill.

Scholars of “memory” who take this approach are adherents of “semiotic,” “socio-cultural,” and “phenomenological” or “hermeneutic” traditions (Craig, 1999). The semiotic tradition approaches meaning as borne through social negotiations of signic, connotative systems (e.g., Ogden & Richards, 1946). The socio-cultural tradition celebrates a reciprocal relationship between a speech community’s enacted language and its social reality (e.g., Whorf, 1956). The phenomenological (hermeneutic) tradition assumes that meaning-making is a process and product of dialogic encounters between people, in which the most basic meanings are their understandings of self, the other, and the relationship (e.g., Buber, 1965). At the
intersection of these traditions, “memory” is conceived as something that is made, shared, and applied by interlocutors within relational, interactive contexts.

The articles that treat “memory” as a function and result of group interaction address two related topics: collaborative decision making and so-called “group memory.” Figure 3 illustrates the development of these conceptions.

*Group interaction topic #1: Collaborative decision making*

Of the interaction-based approaches to “memory” that are listed in CIOS, two address the collaborative nature of group decision making: Karin Aronsson and Claes Nilholm’s “On Memory and the Collaborative Construction and Deconstruction of Custody Case Arguments” (1990) and Michael A. Shapiro’s “Memory and Decision Processes in the Construction of Social Reality” (1991). These articles consider communication in task groups, and shift attention from individuals’ psychological processes to interactants’ relational processes.

This shift is central to these articles, and to the distinction between their conception of “memory” and that of the cognitive/psychological orientation. Although the statement, “In a simulation of lay judges’ deliberations, it is shown how the participants selectively misconstrued courtroom evidence, depending on their overall story frameworks” (Aronsson & Nilholm, 1990, p. 289) may appear like a cognitive application of “memory,” the authors take a different tack. Their goal is to demonstrate “how misrepresentations [of facts presented in attorneys’ arguments] are often coconstituted [by jury members]” (p. 289).

It is our belief that courtroom deliberations might produce . . . hybrid memories in that individual recollections and preunderstandings of the case might interact with recollections presented by other members of the court . . . during deliberations. Recollections, especially in the form of interpretations which are repeatedly presented might thus acquire the status of legal facts or “truth.” (p. 291)

This understanding that “meaning is not inherent in language but something which is continually negotiated in social intercourse” (Aronsson & Nilholm, 1990, p. 292) is central to treatments of “memory” within this topic area of interaction-minded scholarship. This is not to say that the seemingly incommensurate elements of a cognitive approach are absent from this topic area. Shapiro (1991), for one, claims that “exposure to a communication [sic] is not a direct cause of social-reality decisions. Instead people must use various mental processes to interpret those communications and . . . build a picture of the world” (p. 3). Regardless, the

![Figure 3](https://example.com/figure3.png)

**Figure 3.** CIOS-listed articles that treat “memory” as an interpersonal process/product.
“memories” that emerge in group work are generally conceived as important facets of “coconstituted narratives” and “collaborative argumentation” (Aronsson & Nilholm, 1990, p. 313) rather than “the individual’s accumulated store of word meanings” (p. 291).

Group interaction topic #2: “Group memory”
The second topic within the group-interaction category emerged in 2003, marking a significant development in “memory”-related communication scholarship: the establishment of the term “group memory.” The term is a comparatively more catchy equivalent of “transactive memory systems” (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003), a phrase that shares the pages with “group memory”-titled articles in a special issue of *Human Communication Research*. “Group memory” is defined as “a social process” through which interaction permits groups to collate everything that is known to its individual members (Wittenbaum, 2003, pp. 616–617).

It is important to note the subtle but crucial cognitively-minded nugget in this conception: the couching of communication content in quantifiable, informational terms. In fact, the topic area and approach were initially developed by “cognitive and social psychologists [who] have actively ingested collective remembering” as a phenomenon and concept (Wittenbaum, 2003, p. 616). Duly, the original conception of “group memory” retains some commitments to treating communication as a causal-linear process of information dissemination. If groups have access to members’ individual storehouses of information, the line of thinking goes, then groups may potentially perform better than individuals (Pavitt, 2003). Regardless of this commitment within the topic area’s literature, there is certainly a new and important concern for “the social milieu in which remembering occurs” (Wittenbaum, 2003, p. 616).

What the cognitive and social psychologists who were “actively ingesting” issues of group remembering did not initially consider was the role of communication. That is what Wittenbaum (2003) addresses, in an effort to insert communication into this mode of inquiry, or, rather, to bring the concept of “group memory” to communication scholars: “Communication serves as the vehicle though which group members recall information, but communication scholars have largely neglected the study of group memory, and thus there is an open field of research possibilities” (p. 616). “By including communication processes in the study of group memory,” Wittenbaum asserts, “communication scholars can better understand when and why collaboration impairs remembering. Such contributions would add significantly to the group memory literature, complimenting [sic] the input–output models traditionally used by psychologists” (p. 621).

“Memory” as a Process and Product of Public/Cultural Discourse
Of CIOS’s 91 journal “memory”-titled articles, 32 treat the term as a process and product of public/cultural discourse. This category marks a jump from concern for micro-level interpersonal/intragroup communication to macro-level, society-wide
discourses. This category of scholarship emerged in the 1970s with one rhetoric-oriented article—Clark T. Irwin’s “Rhetoric Remembers: Richard Weaver on Memory and Culture” (1973)—but did not erupt until the 1990s, when critical cultural and media studies turned their attention to “memory” as an important concept. In the 1980s there were 11 CIOS-listed “memory”-titled articles, and there have been 19 in the first half of the 2000s. Today, this approach is by far the most prominent, in terms of frequency, of the three major categories.

“Memory” scholars of the public/cultural discursive orientation are diverse in their specific orientations, potentially spanning studies of the “public sphere” (Habermas, 1989), “media effects” (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944), “media ecology” (Postman, 1985), “(post-)colonialism” (Bhabha, 1983), and many other areas. There are some basic assumptions about communication and memory that unify them while distancing the cognitive- and interaction/group-minded scholars, though. Like those in the interaction/group camp, they assume that meaning is socially made rather than objectively a priori. However, the public/cultural-minded scholars are concerned with societal-level (rather than interpersonal) discourse, meaning that they focus less on interaction and more on collective things such as social media effects. This is not to say that, like the cognitive/psychological scholars, they treat communication as a (relatively) simple causal-linear process. They do, though, often consider the intentions of those who control mass media and public discourse and assess the ways in which their communicative strategies, practices, and technology/media shape cultural beliefs and values. An additional difference is that many (but not all) of the scholars in this category take a decidedly critical stance, meaning that their goals are to elucidate and challenge the ideological nature of societal/cultural processes and premises.

The traditions of communication theory and inquiry that motivate public/cultural scholars of “memory” include the “semiotic,” “rhetorical,” “socio-cultural,” and “critical” (Craig, 1999). The semiotic tradition provides means for understanding the ideological dimensions of mass-cultural sign systems (Barthes, 1972). The rhetorical tradition entails concern for public discourse, in terms of its contexts, techniques, and consequences (Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990). The socio-cultural tradition is committed to the assumption that meaning resides in social processes rather than individual minds—that speech communities are defined by the shared ways in which members communicate and perceive their world (Whorf, 1956). The critical tradition conceives communication as both a purveyor of social injustice and a means for fighting back. Critically-minded scholars aim to critique public discourses by explicating and questioning their ideological dimensions (Morrow & Brown, 1994). Across these traditions, “memory” is understood as a shared public and cultural understanding in which history, political identities and relationships, and technology play out in ways that may oppress and/or empower.

The articles that treat “memory” as a public/cultural phenomenon address three related topics (in order of historical emergence): rhetorical studies (specifically pertaining to public address and argumentation), cultural studies in non-mediated
contexts, and media-related cultural studies. Figure 4 illustrates the development of these conceptions.

**Public/cultural discourse topic #1: Rhetorical studies**

The first topic area (historically) within the public/cultural category of “memory”-related scholarship is rhetoric-oriented. Five articles spanning 1973 (Clark T. Irwin’s “Rhetoric Remembers: Richard Weaver on Memory and Culture”) to 2004 (David Hoogland Noon’s “Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory”) consider the relationship between public address/argumentation and societal conceptions of history. There is diverse nomenclature across these pieces, including “collective,” “cultural,” “social,” “popular,” and “historical” kinds of memory. What these conceptions share is a basic sense of how societal (ideological) understandings shape and are shaped by public discourse. In this sense, history is viewed as an inter-subjectively realized construct instead of an objective set of facts.

A representative example of scholarship in this topic area is David Hoogland Noon’s “Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory” (2004). “Written history,” he writes,

> is . . . shaped to a great degree by the constraints and desires of individual authors and the culture to whom their words appear at least marginally sensible. So, too, collective historical memory—what some historians call “social memory”—is guided by massive, complex longings that serve important cultural, political, and psychological needs. In the very least, collective or social memory insists upon some form of shared past whose preservation and retelling are supposed to inspire, sustain, and instruct a people. These collective memories are occasionally subjugated, passed along within marginalized communities for generations, surviving beyond the orbit of dominant historical narratives. (p. 341)

Within this framework, the author conducts a rhetorical analysis of presidential public address that explicates oratorical motivations, strategies, and societal effects. Noon writes:

> To the extent that political leaders since Roosevelt have posed themselves as the latest bearers of the wartime spirit, they have often critiqued their opponents for abandoning that spirit, for ignoring the “lessons of history.” No wonder, then, that George W. Bush has kept the popular memories of World War II in vigorous circulation since 1999. Unlike the United States’ war against the Vietnamese, World War II is popularly (though erroneously) recalled as a time when the values and

![Figure 4](image-url)
beliefs of the public and its soldiers were perfectly squared with those of the political and military leadership. (p. 348)

Viewed as a representative study within the rhetorical topic area of the public/cultural discourse category of “memory” applications, it is clear that such scholarship aims to integrate a communication-as-constitutive assumption into traditional rhetorical/textual analysis. Whereas the rhetorical treatment of memoria, for instance, is marked by cognitive considerations, the approach of Noon and others in the public/cultural category is preoccupied with sociological rather than psychological matters.

Public/cultural discourse topic #2: Media-related cultural studies

The second topic area to emerge in the public/cultural category of “memory” conceptions concerns media and culture, and has a decidedly critical character. This realm of public/cultural “memory”-concerned scholarship has grown significantly since Ian Hunter’s “Realist Cinema and the Memory of Fascism” (1984), featuring four articles in the 1990s and 11 in the first half of the 2000s. Specific topics span television programming (e.g., Weispfenning, 2003), journalism (e.g., Edy, 1999), film (e.g., Owen, 2002), travel guidebooks (Laderman, 2002), radio (Cohen & Willis, 2004), and photography (Hariman & Lucaites, 2003). What these wide-ranging treatments share is a general sense that mass media are crucial conduits of societal knowledges and values, and, further, that such premises advance socially dominant interests in ideological ways.

A representative article from this topic area is Carolyn Kitch’s “A Death in the American Family: Myth, Memory, and National Values in the Media Mourning of John F. Kennedy” (2002), which

is theoretically and methodologically grounded in scholarship addressing the social function of journalism. These functions include unifying readers into communities and nations, articulating and affirming group values and identity, and drawing on and building collective memory. As this body of literature contends, journalists accomplish these goals by telling stories and creating characters who stand for something larger than themselves, something that is cultural and historical rather than personal and momentary. (p. 296)

“For more than half a century,” Kitch writes, “the Kennedy family has been prominent and symbolically powerful in American politics. The Kennedys also have become part of the nation’s cultural mythology” (p. 294). The article traces the maintenance of this mythology in journalistic media from John F. Kennedy’s 1963 death to that of his son in 1999, and observes how the narrative has a “patriotic tenor” or “moral of the tale” that “unites the death of father and son” in a manner that is “not individual and private, but collective and public” (p. 304).

This direction of attention to collective and public issues is what situates media-related cultural criticism in the public/cultural category of “memory”-related scholarship. Its assumptions about the social condition of meaning overlap with those of group-interaction scholars, but the application is on a macro (rather than interpersonal) level of communication phenomena. A further—and important
—difference is the de-emphasis of collaborative dimensions of interaction in favor of concern for how individuals (e.g., journalists) and dominant social classes that control media content may control public knowledges and values.

**Public/cultural discourse topic #3: Non-media-related cultural studies**

The third and final topic area within the public/cultural category of “memory”-related scholarship is closely related to the second, but without specific concern for the role of mass media. In this branch of cultural studies, attention is devoted to public sites of community-making, such as museums (e.g., Katriel, 1994), public shrines (Jorgenson-Earp & Lanzilotti, 1998), and educational programs (e.g., Haskins, 2003). The common concern across this scholarship is for the ways in which cultural premises are maintained through shared connotative symbols. Whereas literature in this topic area is generally grounded in a critical approach, some pieces affirm the community-building power of public discourse.

One example from this body of literature is Ted Prosise’s “Prejudiced, Historical Witness, and Responsible: Collective Memory and Liminality in the Beit Hashoah Museum of Tolerance” (2003). This piece takes an affirmative approach, in that it defends Los Angeles’s Museum of Tolerance from critics who allege that its approach “results in the perpetuation of inauthentic memory” with regard to the Holocaust (p. 363). Prosise asserts, “Memories are socially binding phenomena and thus the question of the ownership of the memory of the Holocaust is a common concern” (p. 363). To understand this concern, Prosise explores the museum’s representational strategy, which casts visitors in roles that allow them to identify with perpetrators and experience transformation.

> The [museum] is designed to be an emotional and sensual experience to challenge visitors, to enhance their sensitivity to others, and to promote their sense of personal responsibility … [Visitors emerge as] responsible citizens, reintegrated into a world where they are free to make a difference. (pp. 362–363)

If there is a major difference between this body of literature and that of the media-related cultural studies branch, it is that this set generally pays less heed to ideological control and more heed to collaborative meaning-making. In the Prosise piece, for example, while the museum is treated as an agent with the power to do things to the visitor—e.g., “challenge,” displace,” and “reintegrate” (p. 363)—there is a certain “negotiated authenticity of the exhibit by audiences” that is a product of “the interaction between the public representation and the audience’s interaction with it” (p. 362).

**Discussion: The Performance of an Institutional Keyword**

“Memory” has emerged and proliferated at an accelerating pace during the past 55 years of communication scholarship. Its recognizability makes it an intuitional keyword; its multifarious conceptions within and across a wide range of epistemological enclaves make it a keyword of particular importance and consequence.
“Memory,” as this study’s tracing demonstrates, has definitional and applicative versatility that both reflects and contributes to the discipline’s complicated, problematic, and fertile condition. A tracing of this term (even if only as a title-word, and even if only within a body of 58 journals) may hopefully provide scholars who work with “memory”—no matter what their particular disciplinary stripes—with clearer senses of the word’s past meanings and, perhaps, future conceptual potentials. Something else that may become apparent through this tracking is the theoretical, methodological, and applicative breadth and richness of communication studies, organizationally and culturally.

A Brief Review of “Memory” Conceptions

As a basis for discussing this breadth and richness, it is helpful to provide a brief review of how “memory” has been conceived across time and epistemologies. Generally, “memory” has been approached from three distinct orientation categories: (1) cognitive/psychological, (2) interactive/relational, and (3) public/cultural-discursive. Each general approach includes various specific topic areas that pertain to “memory.”

The cognitive/psychological perspective, which provides the earliest conceptions of “memory” in communication scholarship, approaches the term with assumptions that communication is a causal-linear process/tool by which individuals express and get objective things, like information. “Memory” in this approach is conceived as a personal skill and/or as a repository of data, and its definition is informed by what Craig (1999) calls socio-psychological and cybernetic theoretical traditions. Topic areas endemic to this category are rhetorical memoria, conversational (episodic) memory, cognitive media effects (which is the most prominent topic area), and psycho-linguistics.

The interactive/relational approach marks a dramatic philosophical departure from cognitive/psychological thought, in that it conceives communication as a constitutive process by which interlocutors collaboratively make understandings of their social worlds. “Memory,” accordingly, is treated as a process and a fluid product of interpersonal contact—especially in group settings. This conception is informed by the theoretical traditions of semiotics, socio-culturalism, and phenomenology/hermeneutics (Craig, 1999). Topic areas in the interactive/relational approach are collaborative group decision making and so-called “group memory.” Of the three general categories, the interactive/relational perspective offers the smallest body of literature among the CIOS-listed, “memory”-titled articles.

The third and, historically, final category of “memory” scholarship is public/cultural-discourse oriented. This category, which has recently overtaken the cognitive/psychological approach as the most prolific of the three, treats communication as the basis of communal knowledges and ideologies on a societal level. Like the interactive/relational paradigm, adherents of the public/cultural perspective recognize communication’s constitutive power, but their concern is for macro-discourses instead of interpersonal contact, especially as such discourses may be
propelled through mass media. “Memory” is thus defined as a collective sense of social history and cultural identity, which has (in many, but not all, applications) ideological dimensions that advance the interests of socially powerful classes. Theoretical traditions that inform scholars in this category include semiotics, rhetoric, socio-culturalism, and critical theory (Craig, 1999).

“Memory” and Communication-disciplinary Fault Lines

The tracing of “memory” across CIOS-listed journal articles demonstrates how the term’s implicit and explicit meanings elude consensus, much less easy agreement among any two parties. Scholars working within a given epistemological niche—characterized by certain journals, nomenclature, name-recognized figureheads, etc.—might inadvertently be cavalier in how they talk and write about “memory.”

As noted earlier, the communication discipline has high degrees of complexity, both internally and externally, in systemic and cultural ways. This study’s tracing of “memory” reveals some important dividing lines between sub-disciplinary enclaves, and even some wide and widening faults. For example, “memory” as a facet of mass-media phenomena may be studied from different perspectives. A cognitively-oriented scholar may apply the word in terms of, say, how accurately individual television viewers recall news stories. A public discourse-minded scholar, though, is likely to address “memory” with regard to, for instance, how a society’s normative senses of cultural identity are both reflected and manufactured in the annual Superbowl Halftime Show. Both researchers/theorists care about mass media effects, but the respective private and public loci of their concerns are quite distant. Especially with regard to what Deetz (1994) called “expressive” and “constitutive” orientations, there is considerable potential for scholars’ concerns and assumptive bases to be so distant as to be wholly incommensurate (Anderson & Baym, 2004).

In one sense, this kind of epistemological contestation is harmful for the communication discipline. The unfettered condition of “memory” both illustrates and performs this. The potential for terminological casualness, imprecision, and ambiguity when it comes to “memory” wreaks havoc with systematic efforts to create theories, methods, and applications. And even though “memory” is just one keyword of many, its incoherent conceptualization reflects and contributes to a convoluted organizational identity. When differently-oriented scholars have philosophical assumptions that are antithetical, they are not very likely to come into contact with one another, by active avoidance or simple lack of cross-exposure. When they are aware of each others’ scholarship, their criteria for evaluating the alien methods and conclusions may be different enough to deny any possibility of respect (Boström & Donohew, 1992; Machlup, 1994). “Memory” across the communication discipline, then, is both a sign and drawer of boundaries. Its degrees of casualness and imprecision signal invokers’ provincialism, myopia, and, worse, ethnocentrism. Its rise and fall as a prominent term across different orientations (as Figure 1 illustrates) manifests and fuels the discipline’s paradigmatic struggles.
“Memory” and Communication-disciplinary Multiplicities

In an altogether different sense, though, “memory” does not simply illuminate dividing lines between disciplinary areas with incompatible and competitive epistemologies, ideologies, cultures, etc. The contested keyword also accomplishes two things that are beneficial to the communication discipline. First, its mutable character reflects and permits disciplinary responsiveness to changing social, political, and technological conditions. Second, it reveals fertile sites of multiplicity, in which synthetic scholarship may flourish.

The communication discipline is an open system that necessarily responds to real human issues. Certainly, historical and social advents like the civil rights movement and digital technology (to name just two examples) change communication phenomena and the contexts in which we enact and make sense of them. The discipline, then, is constantly recognizing new problems and forging new ways of conceptualizing and solving them. The life of “memory,” with all of its historicized mutations and applications, may be recognized as not just an important sign of the discipline’s flexibility, but also as an enabler. The historical view that Figure 1 provides—however abbreviated—encourages reflection on how socio-political circumstances coincide with paradigmatic movement. What events led, say, cultural critical theorists to embrace (co-opt?) “memory” in the 1990s and 2000s? Whereas it is beyond this essay’s scope to answer questions like that, it is possible to assert that communication scholars’ abilities to respond in flexible ways require malleable terminology.

The second way in which the flexibility of “memory”-as-keyword is beneficial concerns its celebration of scholarly pluralism and, further, its enabling of collaboration. The term has enough of a core meaning that people across the discipline are comfortable with it. At once, though, it is sufficiently mutable at the edges of its definitional orbit to permit a wide range of applications. Terms like “collective memory,” “cultural memory,” “group memory,” “historical memory,” “public memory,” “social memory,” and so forth are not necessarily created and uttered casually and imprecisely, in manners that would indicate scholarly disconnect. There are subtle overlaps that demonstrate and encourage cross-pollination, as well as subtle distinctions that demonstrate and encourage conceptual sophistication. These fine commonalities and differences, and their conceptual consequences, will comprise the aforementioned sequel to this analysis, as noted earlier.

Remembering “Memory” as a Performative Keyword

A final point that demands explication concerns the performativity inherent in this essay. This project entails tracing the path of a selected keyword across time and scholarship. This task is beset by certain definitional and practical problems that are irremediable, but, fortunately, somewhat illustrative.

The historical and disciplinal tracking of “memory” is itself an act of remembering, in which particular assumptions and epistemological preferences play out. This is
true, our conception of “memory” mandates, for any kind of chronicle. Frey (1996) shares this commitment, which is made explicit in the preface to his narrative history of group decision making scholarship: “Every history . . . is a constructed history—it is as much a social and political act as it is a ‘fact.’ This review is no exception” (p. 20). An objectivist orientation to communication phenomena would not warrant such a disclaimer; history either happened this way or it didn’t, the supposition goes. The general constitutive take, however, both requires reflective acknowledgement of the narrative’s communicative dimensions and reflective addressing of its consequences.

Our own attempts to trace the historical and topical arc of “memory” are, in and of themselves, contributing particular senses of meaning to “memory.” The very act of trying to define ultimately redefines. In other words, to seek to define is to thwart one’s goals from the outset, at least where institutional keywords are concerned—or at least where this keyword is concerned. This essay’s remembrance of “memory” is conducted with the goal of helping scholars who read and use the term to tease out the implications of its usage, and to invoke it more reflectively. The term is, we posit, especially consequential for communication scholars because, more than, say, mathematics, the discipline’s emergence and formation is continually happening. How one understands her- or himself as a member of this organization is contingent on how one remembers the discipline’s historical condition. And, to remember, one must begin with conceiving what, in fact, “memory” is.

Note

[1] The term “group memory” was, by 2003, already established, but with a different meaning and in the context of business information systems (see Satzinger, Garfield, & Nagasundaram, 1999).

References


## Appendix 1: CIOS-listed Articles with “Memory” in their Titles that Treat the Term as a Cognitive Process or Product

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## Appendix 3: CIOS-listed Articles with “Memory” in their Titles that Treat the Term as Public and/or Cultural Process/Product

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